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The difficulty of beginning 
How should I begin ? If I address this audience by saying « dear 
colleagues », since we are inside the walls of a University, you will expect 
me to give some sort of scientific talk, to provide you (through the use of 
description, slides, overheads) with access to some state of affairs which is 
not present right now in this room, but about which we would gain novel 
information thanks to a bewildering array of transformations offering here 
and now a grasp of things far away in time and space.1 This is what I 
would have done, had I talked about the field work I am doing on a 
French Supreme Court, or had I chosen to describe to you the work my 
friend Shirley Strum is doing on baboons in Kenya, or if this other friend 
                                                
♣ A first draft of this paper was given at a special symposium on Objects organized at 
Brunel University by Dick Pels in September 1999. I tried to retain some of the oral 
tone indispensable for the argument. To make clearer the differences between 
regimes of enunciation, I included a revised section of a paper originally published in 
French, “Quand les anges deviennent de bien mauvais messagers.” Terrain 14 
(1990) : 76-91, translated by Lydia Davis and unpublished in English.  
1 This is the definition of what I have called referential chain. See B. Latour Pandora's 
Hope. Essays on the reality of science studies. (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 
1999)., chapter 2 for a more complete definition. 
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of mine, Steve Glickman, had decided to present you his novel data about 
complex hormonal pathways in hyenas. Neither the supreme court, nor 
the baboons, nor the hyenas would have been present here in themselves, 
but they would not have they been absent either, since through their being 
lifted and displaced into forms (the etymological meaning of in-formation) 
they would have been made to be transportable, describable, countable. 
Then, you could have qualified those informations as  accurate or 
inaccurate, likely or unlikely, disputable or indisputable, interesting or 
uninteresting, true or false. This is what William James called his 
« deambulatory theory of truth », tracing through the successive 
modifications of forms a path in space-time with two provisional termini, 
one here among this distinguished audience, the other absent and far, 
while the connections between the two are laid with various types of what I 
called inscriptions, the « form », which have the peculiarity of maintaining 
some features stable while everything else, « the matter », change.2 Had I 
decided to speak in that way, I would have extended a reference chain a 
bit further by making you familiar with those field sites far removed in 
space and time about which you would have learned something new. 
On the other hand, the interpellation “dear colleagues” could have 
signaled the beginning of something less scientific : an adress not aimed at 
producing a reference pathway, but at mobilizing you as a group, or to 
help, in the very first words of the talk, in providing you with some sort of 
joint identity, of common will, some shared interest no matter how faint 
this common ground could be. Had I intended to do so, I would have 
continued by saying for instance : “Dear colleagues in science studies, after 
having scrutinized scientific practice for so many years, we all need to work 
together towards a more complete understanding of religious practice”. 
Then, you would have evaluated this statement, not by deciding whether it 
is accurate or inaccurate but by deciding for yourself if you wanted or not 
to be part of this “we” and share the common goal outlined for you by the 
speaker, or on the contrary, if you wished to extricate yourself out of this 
common will. Had I begun in that way, I would have started what could 
be called a political exhortation, having to do not so much with states of 
affair far away in time and space, not so much with the transportation 
without deformation of information, but with the formation, the shaping of a 
boundary between “us” and “they” through the performative use of “we”. 
This is what organizers, statewomen, activists often do when they begin by 
the vocative “dear comrades!”, “fellow citizens!”, or even the  subdued 
“ladies and gentlemen”. Groups don’t exist by themselves and they need to 
be constantly whipped into existence, reminded of what they have in 
common, propped to action, stirred into taking their destiny into their 
hands, and mobilized toward some goal. Without information-carrying 
talks we would be stuck here and now without any way to move nor to 
refer, but without group-formation talks we would not know to what entity 
                                                
2 W. James Essays in Radical Empiricism. (London, University of Nebraska Press, [1907] 
republished in 1996). 
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we belong nor with what sort of will we should be endowed.3 
But now suppose that I start this talk by saying “Brothers and sisters!”. 
Since this is clearly an academic setting, something would be odd at once, 
as if I had changed the regime of enunciation and transformed this 
assembly who was expecting a scientific or, at any rate, a quasi-referential 
presentation, into a congregation. “Brothers and sisters” is the way priests, 
parsons, preachers and evangelists adress their Sunday gatherings, and the 
word “sermon” would immediately have come to your mind. Those of you 
with bad memories of sermons would have jumped from their chairs in 
dismay (although it is hard to say whether in our life we have been more 
bored by religious hectoring than by academic lecturing…). But what 
exactly is the difference between the political talk I could have engaged in 
by saying “we in science studies” and this exhortation “brothers and 
sisters”? To be sure, the assemblage of a congregation is also the result of 
some sort of political talk in the same way as any scientific meeting, no 
matter how referential it purports to be, requires some sort of boundary-
making, bond-enhancing. Behind every adress about matters of fact, there 
is an associated group of colleagues and witnesses being produced —“we”, 
in science studies, have shown that. Still, “brothers and sisters” offers a key 
to my enunciation which engage you and me (you in decoding what I say, 
me in continuing what I have begun) on another path than that of political 
talk. 
 How are we going to define this regime of enunciation? If you did not 
switch off your brain as soon as the word ‘sermon’ was uttered, you would 
have probably felt that, if I had addressed you as “brothers and sisters”, I 
would have meant something else than trying to provide you with some 
piece of novel information about something far away in time and space, 
and also something else than offering you some type of identity, goal, 
interest, or common destiny. The first way to register this third type of 
enunciation is so far purely negative, but it is an important sort of 
negation: can I adress you without giving you any information and without 
performing any group-bonding? Let me be even stronger: can I adress you 
so as to take your attention away from the transportation of information 
and the making of identities? Is there room for that form of talk? Had I 
been courageous enough to face the ridicule of addressing you by really 
saying ‘’Brothers and sisters’’, I would have attempted a speech act that 
would have had the strange characteristic of attracting attention to you, 
here and now, as being what I call “persons”. I would have done 
something different from information-transfer or group-making, something 
that could be defined, very provisionnaly, as person-giving or presence-
enhancing. It is to this form of highly specific speech act that generates or 
performs persons in presence and thereby a new assemblage of persons in 
                                                
3 On the political regime of enunciation and the key notion of autophuos see J. Dewey The 
Public and Its Problems. (Athens, Ohio University Press, [1927] republished in 1954), 
B. Manin Principes du gouvernement représentatif. (Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1995). B. Latour 
Pandora's Hope chapters 7 & 8. 
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presence, that I want to dedicate this sermon, I mean this lecture, and 
since I am not masochist enough to dare address and academic setting 
such as this one by a resounding “Brothers and Sisters”, I now start by a 
far less risky : ‘’Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues’’. 
Redeeming the « power » of religion 
« Religion will not regain its old power until it can face change in the 
same spirit as does science ».4 I want to begin with this quote by one of the 
unofficial Fathers of the Church, Alfred North Whitehead. “Regain its old 
power” should not mislead you about Whitehead’s intention nor about 
mine. The question before us today is not to go back to the past when the 
same more or less unified form of life, under the name of Christian 
religion, was assembling into a single civilisation, law, ethics, cosmology, 
piety, charity, science, letters, architecture and politics simultaneously. 
This sometimes beautiful, most of the time stifling, ‘total institution’, whose 
revamping has been dreamed many times by the various revivals of 
religion, especially in Catholicism and nowadays in Islam, is in no way 
essential to religion, but was, in the Christian tradition at least, a contingent 
factor due in large part to the demise of the Roman Empire. Religion has 
no vocation to be the whole of human experience and we have learned the 
hard way —and are still learning— the danger that religious hegemony 
represents for all the other forms of life. To distinguish the different 
regimes of enunciation instead of lumping them into one, is precisely what 
I want to do.  
But to say that religion need never again replace all other functions as 
it once did for contingent reasons, does not mean that, in the non-modern 
world that I am interested in mapping out, religion should be understood 
as if it were a mere remnant of an unenlightened past, as the modernists 
should like to think —Science, with a capital S, illuminating out the dark 
recesses of religious imagination. « Disenchantment has also produced a 
radical disenchantment with the idea of disenchantment itself; or, in other 
words, demythification has finally turned against itself, recognising that 
even the idea of the elimination of a myth is a myth », writes Vattimo in a 
recent book on faith.5  
It does not mean either that religion should remain in a state of utter 
weakness as a puny furniture of an individual soul. Certainly, the failure to 
‘regain its old power’, does not imply that religion should be so debased as 
to become an odd form of psychology. Here is Whitehead again as cruel as 
he is accurate : « Each revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor, 
and each period of slackness a lower depth. (…) Religion is tending to 
degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to embellish a comfortable 
life » (p.223). To sum up, it is not because we want to make sure that 
religion does not overstretch itself that we wish to underestimate its quality. 
                                                
4 A. N. Whitehead Science and the Modern World. (New York, Free Press, 1925 republished 
in [1967]) p.224 
5 G. Vattimo Belief. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999) p.29  
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One of the way to avoid those two pitfalls is not to judge its ability to speak 
the truth according to the conditions of felicity of another form of speech 
act, and to recognize for each regime of enunciation its own dignity, its 
own type of vehicle, itw own key. 
 So we need to be careful with this appeal for religion to “regain its old 
power”. The worst reactionary trends could be mixed with the novel (very 
old, always to be renewed) task of clarifying again what it means. I am not 
longing for the old power of what was in effect not religion but a mixture 
of everything from law and order to spirituality through rituals, arts and 
social work. But I don’t wish either that in the settlement that should 
respect the various forms of talks, religion be reduced to an impotent form 
of psychological consolation because of another contingent history, due 
this time to the emergence of the nation-states.6 I recognize that it is 
difficult because century of bloody religious wars have made indispensable 
to cherish secularization as a way to avoid their return. In view of what 
happened in many nations today, no one in his right mind can wish to 
grant religion its former ‘power’. And yet, it might be desirable to 
reinterrogate secularization and to free religion from the status in which it 
has been forced to shrink in order to buy peace: a purely internal 
individual state of no ontological, cultural, metaphysical or public 
relevance.  
As long as modernism seemed to be the obvious destiny of the planet, 
it was perfectly possible to stick to the older settlement and to consider 
secularization as the only way forward, a scientific world view replacing, 
every day more clearly, the religious attachements of the past. The public 
space of politics was allowed to accept, to be sure, many religious ideals, 
but on the condition that they relinquish any claims to represent another 
reality than that of private beliefs and inner states of worship. What filled 
public space was either the smallest common denominator of political 
interest and consensus, or a sort of watered down, averaged out definition 
of matters of fact as they are said to be offered by Science. The problem is 
that religion, politics and science suffer equally in this process of 
secularization since each has been torn and twisted beyond recognition. 
No matter how risky the task, we have to reopen this traditional western 
settlement that engaged not only religion, but also politics and above all 
science, into one inevitable destiny called modernization. 
 Secularization and modernization cannot pass for a definitive solution 
to the problem of what I call the « progressive composition of the common 
world ». They settle in effect on a very strange type of pluralism: there is 
one world, that of nature, that of what older philosophy called the “primary 
qualities”, the stuff out of which ultimate reality is made, and then there 
are many worlds, those of cultures, those of view points, those of beliefs and 
psychological states, those of religious dogmas. But those many worlds 
have only subjective relevance. They only reach the realm of “secondary 
                                                
6 O. Christin La paix de religion. L'autonomisation de la raison politique au 16° siècle. (Paris, Le 
Seuil, 1997). 
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qualities” without ever having any say on what the world is really like. 
Their imagined worlds might appear  meaningful since they correspond to 
psychological, emotive and personnal attachements, but they are in fact 
meaningless since they have no ontological content. On the other hand, 
the one world, the world of primary qualities  appears  meaningless since it 
represents no value, meaning, interest, emotion, subjectivity whatsoever, 
but is the only meaningful and essential thing there is since it is the real 
stuff out of which we and the universe are made. This is what Whitehead 
has called « the bifurcation of nature ».7 So whenever we reopen the 
question of secularization, we have to realize what price has been payed 
for the sort of pluralism it allowed. In effect, it is a pseudo pluralism for 
which no common ground will ever be offered : either there is one natural 
world but it offers no common value, or there are endless numbers of view 
points but they have no real ground ! The only traditional way out of this 
divided constitution is to obtain closure through a very limitative definition 
of politics that either bring scientific expertise back in (eliminating 
secondary qualities through the brutal import of primary qualities and 
forming thus the one world of nature known by Science), or to reach a 
compromise between equally ungrounded opinions (the struggle of 
interests). I contend that science, politics and religion are all unfairly 
treated in this definition of pluralism which has not explored either 
plurality nor closure seriously.8 
You might wonder why should social scientists not be content to let 
religion be a ‘decent formula to embellish a comfortable life’? Because it 
would have lost its specific “power” (we still have to define what it is), a loss 
rendering us unable to reconnect with what religion was in the past, cut off 
from the springs that generated so many vivid forms of civilisation. More 
importantly, we would be disconnected from the many other cultures, 
persons and nations for which religion —in one of its many guises— is not 
only their present but also their future. How can an anthropologist, a 
sociologist, a scholar, enter respectfully in relation with the Others when he 
or she possesses a thoroughly secularised version of what religion is (or 
more exactly ‘was’, since in the eyes of a secular modernist a religious 
attitude is always something soon to disappear or something to be 
explained by appealing to something else which is its real and hidden cause 
— more of this below) ?  
A large part of what we call ‘fundamentalism’ in many official 
religions today might largely due to a reaction (positive or negative) to the 
modernist gaze that takes it for granted that the question of religion is 
finished, that it can no longer exhibit novelty and change “in the same 
spirit as science”, and that it belongs to the realm of irrational behaviour 
and should be understood in terms of identity, psychology, politics, 
tradition or past influence, that is, everything but religion itself. In my work 
                                                
7 A. N. Whitehead Concept of Nature. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1920). 
8 On the politics of primary and secondary qualities, see B. Latour Politiques de la nature. 
Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie. (Paris, La Découverte, 1999). 
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on diplomacy, I am interested in equipping the diplomats —the new name 
given by Isabelle Stengers for one of the functions of scholar—9 with a 
more charitable and respectful definition of religion than the one provided 
to them  by secular and modernist interpretations so that negotiations to 
compose a common world might start with a better chance of success than 
the usual approach: « Let’s leave religion aside, let’s leave your convictions 
at the door of the common world ». No diplomacy would be possible if 
such preliminary abandonment remained the prerequisite diktat for peace 
talks to begin. Religion cannot be limited to an inner conviction, despite 
our European history that made this essential limit the condition upon 
which Western states built their civil (scientific) peace. History should be 
allowed to move on for religion as well as for politics and science. 
What is the alternative to the secular gaze with its absolute certainty 
that religion is dead ? One way is indicated by Whitehead’s sentence and 
that is to grant again to religion its spirit of change : « Theology itself 
exhibits exactly the same character of gradual development [as science], 
arising from an aspect of conflict between its own proper ideas » (p.217). 
Which conflict ? The one, very well known by theologians, catechists, 
saints, propagandists, between forms of expression which are the 
unproblematic common sense of a period, and the grain of truth which 
tries to germinate withing this ordinary turf. This distinction however is a 
very tricky one. « This evolution of religion, Whitehead continues, is in the 
main a disengagement of its own proper ideas from the adventitious 
notions which have crept into it by reason of the expression of its own ideas 
in terms of the imaginative picture of the world entertained in previous 
ages » (p.224).  
We have to be careful here with the words ‘disengagement’ and 
‘adventitious’ which Whitehead uses unproblematically. These words 
could indicate the well known fight between the Letter and the Spirit, as if 
the lighter Spirit existed as a force counter to the ponderous weight of the 
Letter. This opposition, although traditional would nonetheless be 
completely incoherent within the specificity of religious speech acts as 
expressed for instance by John : « In principio erat Verbum… Et Verbum caro 
factum est (Jn 1-1-4)». The mere opposition of Letter and Spirit leads to the 
misconception that, if given the choice, one could chose the spirit against 
the letter or even without any letter; that one could obtain the 
representation without any representation, could get the Verb without any 
Flesh. This is an essential issue in the crisis of the iconoclast periods.10 It is 
as though a scientist imagined it possible to gain access to reality directly 
without any instrument or against the weight of any instrument. The fight, 
if portrayed in this way, would look like a Manichean dispute between the 
forces of Evil —the Letter— and the forces of Good —the Spirit.  
                                                
9 I. Stengers Cosmopolitiques - Tome 7: pour en finir avec la tolérance. (Paris, La Découverte-Les 
Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1997). 
10 M.-J. Mondzain Image, icône, économie. Les sources byzantines de l'imaginaire contemporain. 
(Paris, Le Seuil, 1996). 
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I want to attempt a different understanding of the distinction between 
forms of expression and what they express (although, because one never 
innovates in religious matters, I should say that I want to make a 
traditional understanding visible again by shaking it a bit). My formulation 
will be the following: there is no other spirit than the letter slightly askew, or 
should I say, bent backward, or, as I have explained elsewhere about religious 
images, slightly broken,11 or in a Derridian formula (should we count him, 
too, among the Fathers or among the Prophets ?) erased, or, to use another 
more material and thus better metaphor, put under stress, tried out, passed 
through the crucible —should I say, crucified ?12  
I multiply the strange metaphors to avoid the too easy conflict 
between  the Letter and the Spirit (which, in its Paulinian interpretation, is 
the one between the Old Law and the New Law), and to replace it by the 
Letter —there is only the Letter, for the same reason as there is only the 
Flesh and the Present— in two slightly different stages, or regimes, or states 
of agitation : the Letter dead or alive. The power of religion (this power I 
am trying to define in this lecture about a sermon I have no authority to 
give) could be elicited again if only we would mark anew the difference 
between a dead and a living Letter, between a representation and its re-
presentation. « The great point to be kept in mind, » says Whitehead, « is 
that normally an advance in science will show that statements of various 
religious beliefs require some sort of modification. It may be that they have 
to be expanded or explained, or indeed entirely restated. If the religion is a 
sound expression of truth, this modification will only exhibit more 
adequately the exact point which is of importance. » p.224  
 Against the iconoclasts in science, in religion and in politics, who all 
imagine that the crisis of representation will be solved if only we could do 
away with all representations, one iconophile should insist that we have 
nothing but representation to which should be added the formidable 
spiritual addition of more re-representation to understand again and anew 
what is, what was, presented the first time. Religion is not about 
transcendence, a Spirit from above, but all about immanence to which is 
added the renewal, the rendering present again of this immanence. (I am 
not inventing anything, this is called ‘incarnation’, in Christian dogma). 
But for this immanence to be visible again in spite of the spiritualism of 
official theology —which is nothing but a distorted kind of rationalism— 
we have to make much more vivid the contrast between chains of 
reference chains and what I will call procession of angels. 
                                                
11 In a paper very close to this B. Latour « How to be Iconophilic in Art, Science and 
Religion? » in C. Jones and P. Galison (editors) Picturing Science, Producing Art (London, 
Routledge: 1998) 418-440. 
12 « The only great paradox and scandal of Christian revelation is the incarnation of 
God, the kenosis –that is, the removal of all the transcendent, incomprehensible, 
mysterious and even bizarre features that seem to move so many theorists of the leap 
of faith » G. Vattimo Belief p. 55. 
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On a crucial difference between instruments and 
angels 
 
 
FIGURE.1. Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533 (National Gallery). 
 
They stand leaning against a pedestal table on which geographical 
instruments are laid out. In the center of the picture, obliquely, the viewer 
can make out a sort of cuttlebone of a brownish color. If he puts his eye to 
the left side of the picture, almost touching his cheek to the painted surface, 
he will perceive a skull. These geographers who are beginning to construct 
the new space of the new world have asked the artist to include in their 
portrait a reference to vanity, a memento mori. Since he agreed, in order to 
obey the laws of this venerable genre, to place a skull in the lower part of 
the picture, why deform it ? Why not add it to the instruments for 
surveying, measuring, and projecting as had been done in the case of so 
many other still lifes and so many other memento mori ?13 
It appears that a secret uneasiness lingers in these inventors of maps 
and these surveyors. What will their world be made of if they actually 
succeed too well in tracing it exactly through projection? Where will they 
put the other world, the ultra-world, that of God and of their faith ? A 
secret uneasiness also lingers in the painter, Holbein, first Catholic and 
then Protestant, one of the best artisans of this new perspective that gives 
the viewer the impression that she is looking through a window the same 
size as the picture frame, at a spectacle that is unfolding before her. If 
Holbein succeeds too well in producing this impression of a spectacle 
projected and represented exactly, how will he also paint the other world ? 
How will he render what is not a spectacle that one is witnessing but the 
movement of faith which transforms and converts ? Most importantly, how 
will he represent in the same relationship and in the same picture the exact 
                                                
13 For a recent description of the absurdly renovated painting see S. Foister and M. 
Wyld Holbein's Ambassadors. (London, National Gallery, 1997) and on the painting 
practice of Holbein D. Wilson Hans Holbein. Portrait of an Unknown Man. (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1996). For a simpler and older account of the same 
material J.-L. Ferrier Holbein, les Ambassadeurs - anatomie d'un chef d'oeuvre. (Paris, 
Denoël, 1977). 
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projection of the new geographical world and that of the divine world ? 
Such is the enigma of this picture : representation triumphs, with its 
ceremonies and its works, its servants and its masters, before the dazzled 
eyes of the viewer. “But where has re-presentation taken place, that is, the 
act of bringing together, again, the convert and the subject of his conversion ?” 
is the troubling question asked by the commissioners of the painting, the 
painter, the faithful believer, and the viewer.14 
In order to resolve this difficulty, Holbein superimposes in the same 
picture two antagonistic points of view. Of the servants and agents of the 
faith, there remains no more than a skull, but a deformed skull, which 
refuses to be integrated into the rest of the picture according to the same 
optical coherence as the paved floor, the tapestries, the bodies, the table, 
and the instruments of observation. Not only does this skull remind us of 
death, as with any symbol of vanity, but it is painted on a slant, projected 
from another plane, as though to remind us that there exists another angle 
of view, another plane. “You are alive, you will be dead,” said the old 
memento mori. “You admire the beauty of your body, of the world, and of its 
forms, you will be disfigured and deformed like this skull,” murmurs the 
new. 
Let us lean over the edge of the picture again, let us put our cheek 
against the varnish (in imagination only, for otherwise the guard would 
become red with anger and the alarms would go off). The cuttlebone 
becomes a skull. But what happens, now, to the proud ambassadors ? They 
turn into deformed, monstrous bodies. If you look straight at the 
geographers, the world of faith becomes misshapen, obscene ; if you take 
care to look straight at the world of faith, of which this skull is the residue, 
the artisans of the form of the world, the geographers, become in turn 
disfigured, grotesque. 
One cannot hold at the same time, and in the same relation, 
representation and re-presentation ; one cannot be at the same time, and 
in the same relation, viewer and convert. Between new science and old 
religion, there is now an incompatibility of points of view. What is 
concealed from the eyes of one is revealed to the eyes of the other. What is 
presented by one is distanced by the other. What is formed and figured by 
one is deformed and disfigured by the other. 
However, in this picture, that alternation is no more than an 
uneasiness and a reminder — a memento, in fact. The entire space is 
occupied by the embassy and geography, perspective and instruments. 
Representation has triumphed. There is scarcely more than this scrap of 
fog, this brown scarf to make us uneasy, to remind us that vision can be 
muddied, that embassies can fail, that geography can be insufficient to 
describe the world, that there is, that there has been, that there may still 
be, other angles of vision. This deformed skull resembles most of all a 
                                                
14 For a completely different interpretation having to do with East West commerce 
routes and luxury goods, see L. Jardine and J. Brotton Global Interests (London, 
Reaktion Books, 2000). 
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compunction, an obsession, a nostalgia. The ambassadors and geographers 
do not in the least want to abandon their new world. They want only to 
remember the possibility of the old one. Of the venerable religious pictures 
there remain only the minimum, projected askew. By introducing this skull, 
the ambassadors, so satisfied with themselves and their painter, literally 
look themselves in the navel, in a very narcissic way. Let us now go back 
up the river of time, let us follow in thought the umbilical cord that 
Holbein wanted to recall by means of his anamorphosis. Let us go back, 
for a while, to the old matrix that will allow us to understand, by way of 
contrast, the tribulations of scientific imagery by comparing them to those, 
neither more nor less painful, of pious imagery. 
The two ambassadors or the two geographers are resting their elbows 
on the table on which lie instruments of cartography, cosmography, 
topography, in short, the graphy of the earth. Their mute faces, their heavy 
clothes, the flagged floor, the table, the beautiful green curtain that serves 
them as background — all this is meticulously rendered in a perspective so 
pure that the numerous commentators of this picture feel it to be 
somewhat maniacal. This picture offers to our eyes the exactly depicted 
image of representatives who in fact have the slightly rigid look of those 
who are, as they say, « en représentation », “showing off.” Even though Jean 
de Dinteville, Lord of Polisy, and Georges de Selve, Bishop of Lavour, may 
be there in flesh and blood and even though the former commissioned the 
picture, they seem so obviously representative of some abstract function 
that the title of the picture almost never mentions their names. Holbein has 
rendered exactly the type of the Ambassador, that is, the loyal and cunning 
mediator, rather content with himself, from whom one demands an exact 
accounting of his mission. But these perfect intermediaries15 are presented 
in a geometrically constructed space, accompanied by the instruments of 
geometric construction or geographical surveying of the world.  
The way in which the space of the perspective is rendered, the 
instruments that are positioned between the two men, all this suggests a 
meditation on the nature of the new mediators, the new spokesmen. The 
old Mediator is also present, but at the top of the picture, to the left, in the 
form of a minuscule crucifix hanging crooked on the wall, crowded by the 
edge of the frame and half hidden by the green cloth that serves as 
background to the scene. Instead of the veil of the Temple being torn in 
two before the man dying on the cross, the stage cloth half covers the 
horror that one no longer wants to see or can see. The cross no longer 
occupies the center of the picture, surrounded by figures ravaged by grief. 
As though in anticipated homage to Max Weber, two figures full of 
themselves frame a chorale by Luther and Merchants Arithmetic by Petrus 
Apianus ! They say the Bishop of Lavour was something of a reformer. I’m 
prepared to believe it. What bishop would agree to be painted standing in 
                                                
15 ‘Intermediaries’ in my technical jargon are the opposite of ‘mediators’ : the first carry 
meaning without distorsions, the second modify both the inputs and the outputs, 
they are in other words ‘events’. 
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front of a book on the calculation of interests while his Lord  hangs 
rejected under a veil at the outer edge of the picture ?16 
The old sacred painting, the old re-presentation, the old mediation, 
becomes incomprehensible to the new ambassadors — and becomes 
comprehensible again, perhaps, in the eyes of the lover of science. Instead 
of contemplating some celestial apparition, piously kneeling on the side, 
the men occupy the place of the holy figures they stand before us and look 
us straight in the eyes as the old Pantocrator. They offer to our gaze the 
instruments that at last allow one to offer the world to our gaze. The 
centers of calculation have in fact become all-powerful. Are we 
contemplating a symbol of vanity or what should be called an “atonement” 
or even an “Extreme Atonement” ? The answer depends on the green 
curtain ; if you part it, the two geographers find themselves, according to 
Baltrusaitis, in the very middle of Westminster Cathedral.17 On the other 
hand, if you keep the veil of the sanctuary closed, they find themselves in a 
warm and well protected spot in the Château de Polisy. 
Depending on whether or not you correct the anamorphosis, whether 
or not you part the veil, you experience either the extreme fragility of the 
world of representation or the anemic character of the world of re-
presentation. In the latter case, Christ mediator has no more blood to spill; 
no one possesses enough strength, now, to set down his Holy Face on 
painted canvas. Pictures are no longer epiphanies, no longer incarnate the 
Presence in oil, varnish, egg, and pigments. Nor do they really present the 
mediators of God ; they represent the world, men, merchants, and the 
sciences. They have become instruments, recording devices. Perspective 
has invented the change of location, without deformation, of an image in 
space.18 Starting from a drawn figure, and without additional information, 
the viewer can reconstruct, with rule and compass, how that figure would 
appear from all the other angles of vision. This geometrical construction 
thus accelerates the production of those immutable motives, those 
constants, that define the work of the scientists, hard or supple, warm or 
cold. If we compare processions and chains of reference, we thus have to 
recognize two opposite ways to deal with context. The first does not 
hesitate to modify the message in order to repeat the same thing — no 
                                                
16 In a present exhibit in Bern, called Bildersturm, the curators have dared reconstituting 
in a sort of Madame Tussaud way, the Protestant iconoclasts at work melting the 
precious vases of the catholic rituals to mint them into coins ! All of this without the 
slightest distance : only as a celebration of the iconoclastic gesture… which proves 
that everything in the Ambassador’s painting is still active today —at least in Bern. 
All idol-smashers are not in Afghanistans, they can be celebrated in confortable 
Switzerland as well. 
17 J. Baltrusaitis Anamorphoses. (Paris, Flammarion, 1984). 
18 W. M. Ivins Prints and Visual Communications. (Cambridge Mass, Harvard U. P., 1953), 
M. Kemp. “Geometrical Description from Brunelleschi to Desargues: A Pictorial 
Means or and Intellectual End?” Proceedings Of The British Academy 70, (1984): 89-132. 
Louis Marin has often made the point that optical coherence allowed for even more 
distorsion to become foregrounded anew, see his beautiful L. Marin Opacité de la 
peinture. Essais sur la représentation . (Paris, Usher, 1989). 
79- A sermon-RES   13 
transport without retranslation ; the second manages to maintain the 
constant message through the process of transformations — a matter of 
constructing immutable mobiles. The first does not capitalize ; the second 
capitalizes indefinitely toward the center. 
In Holbein’s picture, the two meanings of the word “presence” already 
differ so much that we can easily characterize the two different systems of 
translation. One is no longer going to modify the message completely as a 
function of the context, in such a way as to feel the same presence in each 
place ; one is going to try to transport information from one context to the 
other, through a process of transformations, in order to be able to act, in 
one place, from a distance, on another place which becomes, thereby, 
known and dominated. In both systems there is translation, 
transformation, and the maintenance of a constant, but the meaning of 
these three words is totally different. In the first system, one must invent in 
order to remain faithful to what remains always present. In the second, one 
must be able to align inscriptions in such a way that they remain always 
superimposable and allow access to what is distant. The first permits no 
capitalization since from one context to the other no information is 
acquired. The second creates centers of calculation through the 
accumulation of information which removes all the other places to the 
periphery. The first system maintains, through the processions of 
mediations, a revelation, whereas the second permits discoveries. The first 
system forms what I shall call processions, whereas the second creates chains 
of reference. 
An example taken from the midst of the “Quarrel over ritual” (Querelle 
des rites) will perhaps explain the two opposed sources of betrayal and 
faithfulness which lived on side by side for so long. Jesuits who had settled 
in China in the XVIIth century, write to Rome complaining about the fact 
that, under pressure from the Dominican friars, they are obliged to utter 
the formula of the consecration in Latin. In effect, when the priest says: 
’’Hoc est enim corpus meus,” it presents to the ear of a Chinese : “Hocu ye-su-
tu ye-nim co-lo-pu-su- me-um,” which, if the Jesuits did not provide a 
French translation of what the unfortunate Chinese hear at the moment of 
the transsubstantiation, could pass for a fairly good approximation, give or 
take a few consonants, of : “emanation, ancient, lord, office, rule, 
handsome, rest, each, road, flee, thing, meditate, greening, meadows”.19 
Which is the greater sacrilege ? the Jesuits then ask. To present to the 
Chinese ear a hodgepodge that one cannot make head or tail of, or to 
translate the Latin into Chinese, at the risk of using words that possess, in 
the current or literary language, a meaning perhaps shocking to Rome. 
Two definitions of faithfulness and of translation are opposed throughout 
the quarrel over ritual. Either the Jesuits say the message again making 
themselves Chinese with the Chinese, in which case the content of the 
message, compared word by word with that of the Romans, becomes 
                                                
19 Etiemble Les jésuites en Chine, la Querelle des Rites (1552-1773). (Paris, Julliard Collection 
Archives, 1966). 
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incomprehensible ; or the Jesuits imitate the Dominican friars and repeat 
word by word the Roman message, in which case the movement of the 
message into another language, into another civilization, is suspended. The 
Dominican friars, like the Jesuits, can both be branded anathema or 
heretics ; the former because they bravely martyr themselves and see this 
martyrdom as additional proof of their faithfulness to Rome and the 
immunity which the Jesuits enjoy as a proof of their lack of ardor ; the 
latter, because those ignorant and filthy monks, by refusing to adapt their 
message, lose for Christ all of Asia, and if they are indeed faithful are so 
only to Rome. We know what happened. The Jesuits were forced to 
abandon their “dangerous accommodations,” and the Church of Rome 
did in fact lose half the earth, preciously keeping a repository which has 
since shrunk so much because it is taken to be a treasure to be transmitted 
without deformation, that is to say, paradoxically, that it should be 
transported like a scientific reference. 
I chose the quarrel over ritual because it was at that moment that the 
machine for repeating jammed, just as I chose Holbein’s picture because in 
it, the sacred painting of a century earlier was already no more than a 
compunction. 
However, this machine did not always stall. When it functioned in full 
operation, a succession of speeches whose litteral form was different offered 
so many proofs of faithfulness, correct repetitions. If Saint Paul, if Jesus of 
Nazareth, if the Church Fathers, if the unfortunate bishops lost among the 
Visigoths, had settled their quarrels over ritual in the manner in which 
Rome settled that of the 17th century, we would never have heard of 
Christianity. It would have remained one of the innumerable millenarian 
Aramaean sects known only to historians. 
The amplitude of the repetition, the amplitude of the translation, the 
amplitude of the betrayal, is precisely what characterizes, therefore, 
faithfulness to the message on the part of all these inventors, innovators, 
traitors, and translators. Let us think of the amazing faithful betrayal 
through which Jesus, announcer of God’s kingdom, turned into the one 
who is announced, the Christ.20 Since it is now that he has been 
resurrected, the disciples say to each other, it is now, in their language, that 
the Gentiles, the Greeks, the Romans, the Visigoths, must understand him 
for themselves. And let us begin first by translating into Greek, into Latin, 
the words “Jesus,” and the words “resurrection,” let us transform the texts 
through and through, let us interpolate, let us add, let us cut and patch, let 
us adapt, let us invent. Saint Paul says nothing else throughout the epistles ; 
if it is necessary to be unfaithful to the Law and to circumcision, well, let us 
be. “Do not seek him among the dead, but among the living.” Either the 
preaching refers to Jerusalem, to the customs and languages of an 
Aramaean sect of the circumcised, in which case the uncircumcised do not 
                                                
20 On those classical themes of exegesis, see the excellent review of recent scholarship 
done by D. Marguerat, E. Norelli, et al., Eds. (). Jésus de Nazareth. Nouvelles approches 
d'une énigme. (Paris, Labor et Fides,  1998). 
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understand the message, and thus the message, which is all to do with 
presence, is not faithfully transmitted ; or it is faithfully transmitted, and 
immediately, speaking in their languages as on the day of the Pentecost, 
each begins saying something else. 
In this system of translation, through a paradox which we no longer 
understand, one must never cease to speak in a different way in order to be 
able to repeat the same thing. No transport from one point to another 
without transformation. The people who inhabited the Mediterranean basin 
and Europe for fifteen centuries were too different for the letter of the 
message to remain recognizable. Even within a given culture, the letter 
must constantly change, since the message is understood only if it appears 
new, present again for the first time. Here too, no transports of enthusiasm 
without a profound transformation of lives, of rituals, of sentences, of 
works, of mores, of practices, of pieties. In this system of translation, one 
can remain faithful either through daring invention or through repetitive 
transmission and one can betray through tedious repetition as well as 
through careless innovation. 
Processions, too, transport messages, images, rituals, laws, books, 
works, tales, but this transportation is done at a cost of some 
transformation, this balance between what is kept and what is modified 
being called a tradition. What is maintained by this chain of tradition is the 
certainty that, whatever may be the number of intermediaries, they all 
faithfully repeat something similar even if they transform it, because they 
transform it. The intensity of the revelation is proportional to the layering, 
the multiplication, the piling, the redoubling of mediators. An ample 
community is formed among all those faithful transformers, each one of 
whom realizes, for himself, what the others are saying and what he had not 
understood until then. The communion of saints emerges from this 
fraternity : they have had the same experience, they too have understood 
this. What is “this” ? What their predecessors had understood and what is 
still present today in the same forms, in other forms. 
The logic of the processions does not progress, except in intensity ; it is 
afraid of innovation even though it continually keeps on inventing ; it 
endeavors not to repeat tediousness, even though it continually keeps on 
repeating the same rituals. The tradition is enriched without wanting to 
win out. It layers intermediaries, it does not capitalize them. It likes above 
all to establish correspondances, saturate with transversal liaisons the 
different messages amassed in the course of time. It likes to purify the 
message continually, but each purification becomes a new treasure that is 
added to the sacred repository and enriches it, complicates it, further. It 
likes to make the message more precise, but this sets in motion, each time, 
councils, sessions of tribunals, congregations, that accumulate still more 
points of doctrine, theology, and canonical law, and complicate even 
further the movement of the message. 
Immense, venerable, complex, infallible, betraying and translating, 
saturated with mediations, such is this community that maintains the 
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tradition intact by enriching it, by inventing it out of whole cloth, this 
Roman Church from which Henry VIII broke away, these long chains of 
re-presentation among which Holbein chose not to place himself and 
which he no longer depicts except obliquely, like a compunction, viewed 
from the logic of networks. That which layers and forms processions, I will 
call angel in contrast to that which aligns and maintains networks, which I 
call instrument. 
The ambassadors-geographers are not angels. In saying that, I am not 
challenging their morality but their aptitude in creating successions of 
repetition. Inversely, the angels, contrary to common belief and etymology, 
are bad messengers and execrable geographers. Their intellectual 
capacities and their spirit of rigor are not in question, either, but simply 
their inability to show as good references as those of the instruments. 
The angels do not transport an undeformable message through space-
time, they call out to people and keep saying : “Watch out! Take care! He’s 
not here! That isn’t the question ! You’re the one this is about ! Someone is 
going to talk to you ! Don’t hang up !...” Angels are not messengers, but 
meta-messengers — and that is precisely why they are represented as 
beings superior to mail deliverers, telephone operators, and all the modems 
and faxes of this world here below. In painting as in tales, they have a 
phatic function, they say : “Hello !” Who is speaking, what are they saying, 
what is the object of the decision, what is the content of the message ? — 
this the Angel never says, never transports in the form of , an express letter, 
a packet of bytes. It is up to the interlocutor to decipher it. 
It is only if the viewer has understood for him- or herself what it is 
about that one can say the message was faithfully “transmitted.” In other 
words, the exact content of the message is in the hands of the interlocutor, 
the receiver, and not in those of the messenger. The messenger carries a 
container, an interpellation, a metalanguage, a way of establishing every 
possible mediation. If one unfolds the phylactery unrolled by the angels 
one will find another messenqer for instance “Rejoice, for a Savior is born 
unto you” ; and if one unfolds the name of Savior, one will find a 
messenger once again : “It is He the Son of God.” In other words, there is 
never any message ; there are only messengers ; and this is the angelical 
and evangelical message. 
The angel painted on the holy picture — or the picture that one can 
consider in its entirety as an angel — addresses the receiver. If the latter 
occupies the place planned for him by the sender and by the messenger, he 
understands what they both want to say. To understand is to send another 
messenger, different in his content from the first, but one who allows a 
third receiver to realize for himself what the second and the first had also 
understood. From the third to the first one cannot say one has gained much 
since each picture, each tale, each figure differs from the preceding. 
Of course, from the point of view of an outside observer, one has 
gained in richness since new works, new dogmas, new acts of faith have 
been produced, but there exists no point, along this chain, where one could 
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capitalize all the intermediaries and accumulate what the others have said, 
done, or been. In fact there is no outside observer, there is not yet any 
outside observer, capable of capitalizing. The first did not send any 
message-content to the third. The third did not obtain any information 
about the first. On the other hand, the third has the impression of 
understanding exactly what happened to the first, what burst in on the 
second, what descended suddenly in a great rustling of feathers and wings. 
The same thing is happening to him or her now. 
What is peculiar about religious truth is that it can never appear as a 
new idea, since it does not inform, and yet is mendacious if one does not 
have the impression one is hearing it for the first time. To understand the 
good news that the messenger is bearing is to perceive at last that this news 
is a renewal of all the messengers borne since the dawn of times. All the 
envoys are returning ; the delegates are swooping down on the interlocutor 
like a flight of thrushes ; everything is a great beating of wings. If other 
enunciations, such as those of fiction, for instance, consist in sending 
messages and messengers elsewhere, into another space-time, in order to 
take leave of the ego, hic et nunc, one can say that the angels, on the contrary, 
bring the interlocutor back to the ego, hic et nunc.21 When they appear, 
people are presented to one another. All disengagements are annulled ; all 
delegates merge. The multiplicity of witnesses now say only one thing, 
form one single body. Those venerable expressions are not so imprecise, 
that say that the Heavens gape, that one sees processions of angels, that 
one hears a divine music, that the light becomes blinding. To paint these 
illuminations is truly the faithful way of repeating the messenger : time is 
vanquished ; space is vanquished. “Death, where is thy victory?” 
But if the meaning of the word representation is allowed to mutate, if 
the angels are no longer asked to present the good news once again to an 
interlocutor who will once again give content to the message, they are 
asked to move through space-time a content which would be its exact 
representative whatever might be, in other respects, the moral or mental 
state of the receiver and whatever might be the successive materials 
assuring its transport. Angels are no longer asked to transport with 
enthusiasm a messenger and one of the faithful, but to transport faithfully a 
message. They no longer convoke the faithful ; they are convoked so that 
they may all align themselves and form, through the superimposition of 
their messages, a single continuous conduit that would give one access to 
Jerusalem “as though one were there.” 
Alas, convoked and aligned in this way, not a single one of the old 
mediators superimposes his message on the preceding one. The good 
angels become bad angels. How wrenching it is to see that the wonderful 
pictures are dreadful informants ; that the successive apparitions of the 
truth are embroideries ; that the tales that had transported us with 
enthusiasm during fifteen centuries give no detailed information about 
                                                
21 For a definition of enunciation structure, see A. J. Greimas and J. Courtès, Eds. (). 
Semiotics and Language an Analytical Dictionary. (Bloomington, Indiana U.P.,  1982). 
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anything and that the more precise, psychological, historical, and detailed 
they are, the more belated, apocryphal, or reshaped they are ! 
Used as instruments of knowledge, the angels immediately lose their 
colors and their feathers. They fall. Called upon to say once and for all 
what the message is that they bear, they are obliged to confess, 
embarrassed and sheepish, that they have no message, that they have lost it 
along the way, or that in fifteen centuries they have, believing they were 
doing a good thing, substituted many other messages for the original 
message. Once their phylacterieshave been deciphered, they hang 
miserably and are not worth even the price of a fresh recording tape. 
This fall of the angels seems all the more dramatic because the two 
opposing systems of translation are both just as complete, they both excite 
the best minds of the time, and each defines truth, exactitude, faithfulness, 
and mendacity, but in different ways. In the translation of the angels, the 
signified —a past participle— can change form and this won’t matter, 
provided the signifying —a present participle— remains intact. Past 
participles as different as “Yahveh is coming,” “the Kingdom of God is 
near,” “Jesus was the Messiah, “Son of God,” “Mary mediator,” can all 
express equally faithfully what is presently participating into the elocution. 
Angels all become equally mendacious as soon as the unfaithful reverses 
the movement and takes the superimposition of signifieds for faithfulness, 
independently of its participation in the signifying. Yet it is precisely this 
translation that assures, in the other system, faithfulness ! Only if it is 
possible to maintain intact a signified, a content, whatever may be otherwise 
its successive signifiers, will one be able to represent exactly in one point of 
space-time all the other points. 
 
  
Logic of PROCESSIONS Logic of NETWORK 
same container throug different 
contents 
same content through different 
containers 
faithfulness = play of repetition 
which keeps the same message always 
new 
faithfulness = superimposition of 
the inscribed contents 
unfaithfulness = either dangerous 
innovation or tedious repetition  
unfaithfulness = loss of alignment 
through containers  
the message is a messenger the message is a piece of information 
the meaning depends on the 
receiver  
the meaning does not depend on moral 
state of the receiver 
gain = different repetition of the 
same messenger 
gain = new information 
multiplicity of mediators  capitalization of mediations 
if transfer successful : all mediators 
are present 
if transfer successful: annulment  of 
mediators 
return to the hic et nunc 
presentation 
extension in space-time access to the 
distant 
re-presentation re-presentation 
faithful believer is struck scientist is dominant 
knowledge without possessions   cumulative knowledge 
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compatibility with the past progress through elimination 
 
 
Two opposite misinterpretations 
If we now have a better grasp on this contrast between those two 
different vehicles, it might be easier to lift some of the obstacles to the re-
representation of religion today —and by today, I really mean today, hic et 
nunc for you as listeners composing now, because of my unusual manner of 
speaking, a gathering of persons, those who receive the present of presence 
(who, at least, would have got it if I had given a sermon and not a lecture 
about the difficulty, nowadays, of giving sermons)? Alas, the obstacles are 
formidable —have been made formidable— because of two 
complementary and opposite moves, one among the religious 
propagandists and the other in the camp of their enemies. I would call the 
first the ‘arrears in translation work’ and the second the ‘curse of 
antifetishism’. 
Arrears in translation 
Let’s begin with the first. This growing gap in translation work (and it 
grows every day) is due to the abandonment by religious minds of this 
‘spirit of change’ advocated by Whitehead. As he said so forcefully, this 
laziness, this defensive attitude, although it looks like a courageous 
championing of religion against the decadent spirit of the age —we hear a 
lot of this coming nowadays from the City of Vatican— shows in effect, he 
says provocatively, a lack of faith : « They [theologians] pictured themselves 
as the garrison of a fort surrounded by hostile forces. (…) This particular 
picture fostered a pugnacious spirit which really expresses an ultimate lack 
of faith », and he goes on, in a less convincing way : « They dared not to 
modify because they shirked back the task of disengaging the spiritual 
message from the associations of a particular imagery » (p.225). We find 
again the unfortunate word ‘disengaging’ and the danger here in which 
Whitehead might fall of using the Platonic trope of a spirit versus letter 
(‘spiritual message’ versus ‘particular imagery’) as if religion had anything 
to do with spirituality, as if the message it conveys could be anything else 
but ‘the imagery’ under a certain strain that we have to define —no ! that 
we have to perform on the spot, today, at this hour. Without imagery and 
without particular imagery there is no spirit whatsoever.22 
But in spite of the iconoclastic slippage, the argument is clear: if you 
fail to modify the imagery you also fail to convey the message and you 
increase the gap in translation, forcing the listeners to confuse the dated 
imagery for what there is to understand : you replace a genuine mystery by 
puzzling artifactual enigma. There is no other sin than this one: having 
confused the message with an artifact, having confused the distinction 
                                                
22 This is the beautiful expression taken from the Byzantine quarels by M.-J. Mondzain 
Image, icône, économie « La vérité est image, mais il n’y a pas d’image de la vérité ». 
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between the scandal of faith with the completely artificial scandal of trying 
to sell counterfeit puzzles for deep mysteries. Vattimo has turned this into a 
new right : « All of us should claim the right not to be turned away from 
the truth of the Gospel in the name of a sacrifice of reason demanded only 
by a naturalistic, human, all too human, ultimately unchristian, conception 
of God's transcendance » (p.55). 
We can now elaborate the first sentence of Whitehead : if scientists 
spend nights and days trying to make absolutely sure that the new 
phenomena they elicit are not artifacts but incontrovertible facts, how 
much more scruple, how many more nights and many more days should 
not be spent by theologians and the common folks to make sure that they 
are not confusing what there is to say —the stress, the strain in the 
expression which by definition has to be renewed for each utterance— and 
accepted modes of expression —which pass, like cultures, fashions and 
time. The Christian tradition has been built upon that scruple, and so have 
all the successive renewals and the great Reformation itself, but it is fair to 
say that, in the last three hundreds years —the age of science precisely— 
this spirit of change, this ability to accept novelty, this daringness in 
invention, the discrimination between spirit and letter has been stalled  
There exists a good proof of that interruption in translation which is as 
simple as it is devastating. That religious power is not understood is clear 
in that it provokes any good solid contemporary mind to recoil in 
discomfort —a reaction I am sure, generated in this assembly by my 
talking about it in a serious manner— or, even worse, it triggers a yawn of 
polite indifference. What is the power of a form of speech that has lost all 
power —a salt which has lost its bitterness? What is the meaning of a new 
truth that is heard by its listeners as the rehashing of one more old lie ? 
The drama here is that, by a typical reversal of the attribution of 
responsibility, reactionary Christians take as proof of the tediousness and 
decadence of this age what is in fact the result of their own laziness in 
pursuing the translation task of their fathers. Instead of woefully confessing 
that they have failed because they have not been understood, they believe 
themselves in the right to keep to their old ways precisely because of the 
outrage they generate by sticking to miserable formulas against common 
sense. The dream of catholicity has shrunk in a nightmare of the peculiar. 
In a complete reversal of the story of the Pentecost, when the Holy Spirit 
made every nation understand the same message in one’s own language, 
Christians managed to make every nation misunderstand the same message 
clothed in a language which is utterly foreign to all ! It takes a Devil to 
manage this heresy of all heresies : the constant shrinking of the meaning 
of religious meaning (infinitely worse than the heresies reproached to the 
contemporary world who was left with nothing else to do but select out of 
these huge dead bodies beached on their shores bits and morsels of rituals, 
imageries and dogmas for their multifarious sectarian interests).  
The measure of this heresy becomes apparent in this remarkable 
sentence of Whitehead : « The presentation of God under this aspect of 
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power awakens every modern instinct of critical reaction. This is fatal ; for 
religion collapses unless its main positions command immediacy of assent. 
In this respect the old phraseology is at variance with the psychology of 
modern civilisations » p.227. Against all the reflexes of reactionary 
Christians, we have to say that ‘the psychology of modern civilisation’ is 
right, and if this contemporary spirit is shocked by the demands of odd 
claims it is not a good scandal, but a bad one, because the psychology of 
secular Europe is the ordinary common sense which should be used to 
signify what it means to be religious today, and which has been lost by 
trying to replace it by the representations of 4.000 BC desert nomads, of 
12th century servants, Renaissance literati, or 19th century exquisitely polite 
Victorian dons. ‘Immediacy of assent’ is the key to the power of religion.  
Whitehead's conclusion is inescapable : if an all powerful God is no 
longer understandable, it should be replaced by a powerless God ;23 indeed, 
if God itself is an obvious obstacle to religious understanding, God should 
be declared dead (again, no innovation here, that the son of God has died 
is part of the canon). Exactly in the same way that Paul declared 
circumcision to be no longer the sign of a pious soul, belief in God should 
be discarded, as have Ptolemeus’s epicycles or the ether of the 19th century 
physicists. This does not mean a wholesale abandonment of the religious 
message, a surrender to a wordly spirit, since the message of religion was 
never more at ease in the ordinary belief in God of the former centuries than it 
is in the secular atheism of the present age. Existing more easily in one 
given form of expression is not the character of this sort of message which 
represents itself in the cracks, discrepancies, uncertainties, dissimilitudes, 
breaking up of any form of common parlance. If God had been so good as 
an expression of the faith, then why retell it through the verb of Christ ? 
and if Christ had been so definitive an expression, then why should the 
Holy Spirit be invoked to renew the meaning ? and if the Holy Spirit was 
so accurate a statement, then it would be in vain that the Church has be 
deploying its hesitations over the erratic course of history. 
 Theologians should not shun but on the contrary embrace the 
formidable chance provided by a thoroughly secularised spirit to say that 
there is no powerful, omniscient, omnipresent Creator God, no 
providence, that God does not exist (or maybe does not exist yet, as 
Whitehead could argue), and to see in those common-sense obvious 
features of ordinary talk the expression, the power of religion which may 
start exactly as freshly as it once did, when it had to use the obvious 
common parlance of ancient people for whom God was as unproblematic 
as market forces are for us today. Expanding on Whitehead again, I could 
say that as long as people don’t understand religion in the same way as 
they understand shopping (to take within Americanised cultures another 
                                                
23 ‘’All actual entities share with God this characteristic of self-causation. For this reason 
every actual entity also shares with God the characteristic of transcending all other 
actual entities, including God’’ A. N. Whitehead Process and Reality. An Essay in 
Cosmology. (New York, Free Press, [1929] republished in1978), (p.223). 
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‘total institution’ which, in its complete and undisputed grasp might 
arguably be reminiscent of what religion might have been in the Middle 
Ages), the gap in translation, the debt in translation will not have been 
repaid. Let me say this even more provocatively : in the good old days, 
supposedly ‘Ages of Faith’, people went to Church with the same alacrity, 
ordinariness, and lack of surprise as we now go shopping on Sunday. No 
use in opposing faith and shopping, like spirituality and materiality because 
in both cases there was something that rendered Faith alive and not dead 
and it is this same thing that should now turn —if only you did not ‘lack 
faith’ !- the ordinary way of life (shopping) into the power of religion. In an 
extraordinary metaphor, really worthy of the Fathers, Whitehead, in 
another book, writes : « A system of dogma may be the ark within which 
the Church floats safely down the flood-tide of history. But the Church will 
perish unless it opens its windows and let’s the dove to search for an olive 
branch» (p.145-146).24  
The weaknesses of antifetichism 
But the diplomatic work would be impossible, and the dove would 
never find any land, if we were only castigating the religiously minded for 
their mounting deficit of translation —immensely larger and deeper than 
that of the US commercial deficit and caused by a much less healthy 
economy of signs... For the dove to bring back an olive tree, the olive tree 
must be planted. Unfortunately, if we now turn to the enemy camp, the 
chances are no better for the resumption of talks. It just happens that 
religion has been used, since the 18th century, to sharpen the teeth of social 
scientists in forming the ideal of what a good explanation of a clearly 
irrational phenomenon should be. As a way of making sense of religion, 
against which, for a number of good political reasons, they had to fight —a 
religion itself so slow in sorting out the many various features which had 
been mixed by mistake in its premature dream of totality— they invented 
the notion of belief.  
This is where fetishes enter the European scene (as William Pietz has 
so beautifully documented) as an accusation levelled against believers by 
non-believers, although I should really say : levelled against non-believers 
(since no one, according to me, has ever believed in any fetish) by believers, 
that is, by those rationalist scholars who believe in beliefs as an explanation 
of otherwise absurd behaviour (as they describe ‘worshipping an idol’).25 
Belief in belief has the unfortunate consequence of depriving the one 
accused of holding belief of any connection with the what that is the object 
of the belief. For instance, it became obvious for most sociologists of 
religion, that God cannot have any role in the behaviour of any believer 
                                                
24  A. N. Whitehead Religion in the Making. (New York, Fordham University Press, 1926). 
25 W. Pietz. “The Problem of the Fetish, I.” Res 9, (1985): 5-17. 
“The Problem of the Fetish, II: the Origin of the Fetish.” Res, 13 (1987): 23-45. “The 
Problem of the Fetish, III: Bosman's Guinea and the Enlightenment Theory of 
Fetishism.” Res, 16 (1988): 105-123. 
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who says things like ‘God makes me do this’, ‘God revealed this to me’, or 
‘inspired me’ or ‘saved me’. Confessions like those of Augustin are for them, 
in all their explicit statements, a tissue of lies, or more politely, an 
expression or symptoms of other deeper and darker forces, which it is the 
task of the analyst to unravel. 
We are so accustomed to this professional reflex that when we have to 
study a pilgrimage where the Virgin Mary appears at noon every Sunday, 
no one in his or her right scholarly mind would take the Virgin herself as the 
reason why so many people gather there every Sunday for decades, in spite 
of the fact that this is what is explicitly said by thousands of the faithful. If 
they confess « the Virgin has changed my life », they are deluded and 
should be either redressed —in the militant manner of past centuries— or 
studied with interest —according to the hypocritical respect of so many 
social scientists— as one more glaring case of manipulation by forces 
unbeknownst to the actors. 
Nowhere more than in religious studies did scholars in the social 
sciences learn : a) to deprive of any proper ontological status the entities 
invoked by those they study; b) to ignore the explicit wordings and 
behaviour of those they study ; c) to substitute what is said to be felt by 
what is not said and not felt, the ‘unknown’ which only they, the social 
scientists, see and feel (or, as they say, ‘know’). Once one gets used to the 
strong opiate of unknown forces manipulating human actors in spite of 
themselves, one never recovers from it and persists in ignoring every day 
more and more what actors themselves say. Yes, religion is the opium but 
not of the people, it is the opium that put social scientists readily to sleep at 
the very moment when those they are in charge of studying are being made 
to act by others. It would take one hundred Garfinkels to awaken social 
scientists from this deontological slumber : to sleep, perchance to dream, 
that you provide explanations more apt that the account given by people 
for why they act, why they are acted upon.26  
Needless to say, when this method of explaining away religion was 
used for (I should say ‘against’) science, it failed pitifully because you can 
not possibly separate the scientists from the entities which (they claim) 
make them act. If priests and monks and common folks did not scream 
when sociology of religion took their divinities away, scientists did scream 
when science studies claimed to account for their ‘belief’ without taking 
into the things themselves they were talking about — and they were right ! 
Pretending that the entities of science make ‘no difference’ to what 
scientists say about them, is so patently absurd that it should have killed 
social explanations of science from day one.27 One of the reasons why it 
was not dead at birth, I propose now, is that, then, social scientists would 
have had to also abandon this implausible type of explanation for every other 
                                                
26 The basis of the ethnospsychiatry cure developped by T. Nathan L'influence qui guérit. 
(Paris, Editions Odile Jacob, 1994) is precisely to reverse this tendency. 
27 On why it did not, see D. Bloor. “Anti-Latour.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
30, 1 (1999): 81-112 and my response. 
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field of inquiry, including religion —their ideal-type of antifetishism.  
A powerful antidote to the antifetishism of the social sciences, is to 
consider, on the contrary, that, in human fields of inquiry, what people 
explicitly state as the cause of their actions, is probably the best source we 
have to understand it —especially if we grasp the great number of foreign, 
non-human entities which are mixed with human behaviour; yet this 
notion was so radical for the anti-religious and pro-scientific (and lately 
antiscientific spirit) of the social sciences, that they preferred to stick to 
their belief in belief and went on providing antifetishist ‘explanations’ of 
the worship of fetishes —without realising that no one in the whole history 
of humankind has ever worshipped a fetish in the way iconoclasts have 
believed,28 without realizing that this belief is entirely limited to the 
scholarly reaction against all forms of religion, a passing moment in the 
history of the social sciences. 
One should not, however, entirely despair of the social sciences. 
Things are fortunately entirely different if, taking the cue from science 
studies, scholars begin to apply the same type of non social explanations to 
religious matters. This is the decisive stance inaugurated by the 
anthropologist Elizabeth Claverie29 and put to good use in a remarkable 
book by the Belgian sociologist Albert Piette on a French catholic parish.30 
The alternative to social explanation of beliefs is of course not the 
downright acceptance of theology, no more than the critique of social 
studies of science is a wholesale sell off to epistemology and its diverse 
forms of realism (both traditions, by the way, fusing in some physicists 
dream of being themselves God or at least His intimate counsellors). On 
the contrary, this is where the lack of taste, the lack of tact, the lack of 
empirical grasp of the antifetishist reveals itself so markedly. If only the 
social scientists had not discarded so swiftly the entities which actors 
explicitly say make them act, and had not replaced them by unknown 
forces which, they believe, make the actors behave, they would have 
perceived the extraordinarilary different ontological status of those entities 
—Virgin, saints, miracles and gods— from  the one imputed by belief in 
belief. It is precisely this multiplicity in what makes us act, in modes of 
action, that I call factishes, by fusing the two words of fact and fetishes and 
paying once more attention to what, in any form of action, overtakes 
action.31  
When Albert Piette becomes attentive, in a thoroughly constructivist 
(not social constructivist) stance, to the many ways in which contemporary 
French provincial Catholicism is lived, he finds almost no instance, in 
                                                
28 A similar point is made in M. Taussig Defacement. Public Secrecy and the Labor of the 
Negative. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999). 
29 E. Claverie. “La Vierge, le désordre, la critique.” Terrain, 14 (1990): 60-75 ; “Voir 
apparaître, regarder voir.” Raisons Pratiques, 2 (1991): 1-19. 
30 A. Piette La religion de près. L'activité religieuse en train de se faire. (Paris, Métailié, 1999). 
31 B. Latour. “Factures/fractures. From the Concept of Network to the Concept of 
Attachment.” Res, 36 (1999): 20-31. 
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several years of field work, of a single one of those beliefs supposedly 
occupying the mind and heart of the believers. God is thoroughly hidden 
in many contradictory practices where He or It appears elusive, fractional, 
polytheistic, weak, uncertain, even in burial ceremonies or during masses. 
This should not be so surprising after what I have said about the difference 
between representation and re-representation. Augustin’s positioning of 
God in his Confessions is exactly as contradictory : the immutable God to 
whom he is talking is also supposed to undergo many mutable passions, 
desires, wills and providential acts. The same is true of Claverie’s work on 
pilgrimages where pilgrims actually photograph the apparitions of the 
Virgin Mary and discuss endlessly the shapes appearing in their Polaroid’s 
without insisting very much on eliciting the ontological status of an 
obdurately long-lasting Virgin Mary. They speak of what is (for me) images 
of clouds upon clouds, and not of one enduring substance as the entity 
converting them. Religion in general is not about long lasting substances. 
 So where is belief coming from if it is nowhere to be seen in religious 
practice, when studied by social scientists freed from antifetishism ? 
Strangely enough, belief is patterned under the model of science. If we 
untie the notion, belief is conceived as a vehicle for access to something 
through transformation, typical of scientific inscriptions, only that the 
object of access is said to be hidden. The belief in belief is thus a charitable 
construction using the method of science to understand what it is to access 
something far away in space-time, except that there is no terminus. Belief is an 
imitation of knowledge without ground. Hence the endless and 
meaningless questions « Do you believe in God or not ? » patterned against 
the question « Do you believe in global warming or not ? ». The latter can 
be given a terminus whereas the former cannot. Asking this type of 
question (« Do you believe that you see the Virgin in those Polaroid’s ? ») 
to persons who are construed thus as ‘believers’ is for the religious speech-
act, a condition of infelicity. Religion is not about belief in anything special 
to which one could gain access by saying ‘yes’ in spite of many doubts about 
its reality. Although this sounds counterintuitive, religion should not and 
never was defined by beliefs in things absent and distant, invisible and 
beyond. God is not the object of a belief-action. Faith and belief have 
nothing to say to one another, nor need the faithful and believers to 
coincide.  
Let’s be more radical : to phrase the religious speech-act in terms of 
beliefs is to contravene the third commandment, it is to speak in vain the 
name of God —a sin, a mortal sin I am told. Better to have one’s tongue 
cut off than utter this curse. To be fair, many religious minds have 
committed this sin by accepting, during the science-religious wars of the 
past, this definition of belief as grasping the ungraspable or accessing the 
inaccessible. Unable to express anew their faith, once faced with the 
powerful intrusion of the newly discovered referential chains, they fell back 
into a belief in something they call ‘suprasensible’, as if they could emulate 
the vehicle of science and go even further to the suprasensible. As if there 
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were a suprasensible, a world of beyond, a second chance, an afterlife! As if 
religion had anything to do with dreams of an afterworld! Non-believers 
began to believe that they really had to believe due to the critical pressure 
exerted by believers (their critics) who really believed they and only they 
did not believe ! What a comedy of errors. 
The paradox of the method introduced so magisterially by Elizabeth 
Claverie, is that when you at last take seriously the objects of belief —
against the long disrepute they had suffered because of antifetishism— far 
from shining with a glorious independence, those objects begin to circulate 
inside totally implausible networks, occupying positions that neither 
theology care to recognise nor sociology to follow, so different are they 
from the traditional Church doctrine and from the ideology of a social 
explanation through hidden infrastructures. As Piette suggests : « God is 
not a very demanding entity ». Where sociology of religion leads us, angels 
fear to tread. 
Science students like myself should not be surprised by this turn of 
events : the situation is exactly the same as the one revealed by so much of 
our work: once the noise made by epistemology and social explanations are 
toned down, the delicate music made by scientists with their hundred 
nuances of realism may at last be heard.32 The many ways in which 
scientists intricate themselves with their subjects-objects of study have 
become so bewildering that it will take  decades before we can  begin to 
map them out. Science studies has completely renewed the repertoire of 
practical metaphysics entertained by the sciences —in spite of the shabby 
repertoire claimed by modernist grand narratives. Similarly, we can 
imagine how long it will take for social scientists to begin to map the ways 
in which people are made to act by Virgins, UFOS, Gods, fetishes, 
divinities, once we stop using the repertoire of antifetishim.33  
When will we be at last able to entertain in the social sciences some 
real form of agnosticism, meaning the abandonment of belief as a rightful 
way of accounting for any attitude ? When, moreover, will we be able to 
entertain a coherent form of atheism, that is to accept that the ordinary way 
of talking about religion today is through common sense atheism, which 
performs the same role as the common sense powerful Gods of a bygone 
past ? Yes, we can now say wihout fear of criticism, agnosticism and 
atheism are good resources for the social sciences provided the first means 
suspending any form of antifetishism and the second to seriously begin to 
pay attention to the ‘former power of religion’. 
An effort at retranslation 
How to bring this discussion  to a close ? Words are missing. Not 
                                                
32 See P. Galison Image and Logic. A Material Culture of Microphysics. (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), the last chapter of I. Hacking The Social 
Construction of What? (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1999) and above 
all K. Knorr-Cetina Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge. (Cambridge, 
Mass, Harvard University Press, 1999). 
33 E. Gomart Surprised by Methadone. Thèse de doctorat. (Paris Ecole des Mines1999). 
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because what is being signified is ineffable, as it is often so leniently 
claimed, but because the ‘immediacy of assent’ has been lost. The deficit in 
translations —this mounting arrears of transformation in what there is to 
say— is too great whether in the camp of religion or in the camp of its 
enemies (if we insist on talking about camps for a few moments more). But 
if I do not attempt to find the words, I would have lost the occasion to 
renew hic et nunc for you and for me the chance of re-representing the 
representation. And there is no more opportune moment than this one, no 
other kairos, to understand what is performed by the religious speech-actsI 
can’t delay it. I have no choice. Why ? Because, if I spoke otherwise, I 
would try to designate something absent, another moment in the past or in 
the future, another spot in space, and then I would be talking not about 
you, now, but about those other than you or those other darker parts in 
you. And then I would be lying. Religious talk, as we begin to see, cannot be 
about anything other than what is present. It is about the present, not 
about the past nor about the future. It speaks when we no longer strive for 
goals, far away places, novel information, strong interests, as though all 
had been replaced by a much stronger sort of urgency : it speaks of now, of 
us, of final achievements that are for now, not for later. Religious talk has 
the strange property of considering only mediators and not intermediaries 
acting as vehicles for accessing something which is absent.  
My formulation seems odd at first, because we are accustomed to  
considering religion in the manner of ‘’a belief in something’’ and to fall 
into a form of speech that opposes this base material world of present 
empirical stuff with a more spiritual and detached absent world of beyond. 
But we have now understood that this way of locating the power of religion 
has become meaningless because it distracts attention toward absent and 
non-existing substances. As soon as one does so, the spirit of religious 
language wither on one's tongue. No matter how counterintuitive it might 
appear at first, the taste for present materiality is much stronger in religion 
than in any other form of life because it exclusively and obsessively 
designates the putting into presence, the actual and final realisation of 
goals. « Times are accomplished». It is not in vain that the word 
incarnation has been used to describe this reconcentrentation on the 
presence. With religion, it is always : ‘’back to the flesh’’. 
In order to attempt to become again more familiar with this simple 
evidence, let’s consider two layers of expression, one completely outdated 
and the other still alive, although marginalized, inside European cultures.  
The first one is the fable of the Annunciation represented in perhaps a 
million images throughout the centuries : ‘I am the servant of the Lord’, 
says the Virgin (or is said to have said in Luke’s invention of this episode) 
and the acceptance of the presence of presence transforms her in someone 
who harbours the presence of God, not metaphorically, but really, since 
she is made pregnant, and not of a God of beyond, but of a God now in 
the human flesh. There exists now in this world not in the next, in this local 
place, in this humble bosom, a reserve of definitive and final presence. 
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Now, let us not attempt the horrific : let’s not apply to this fable the truth 
detector invented by the belief in belief : the story will die with the 
implantation of the first electrode. If you begin to ask « was there a 
Mary ? »,« was she really a Virgin ? », « did the angel speak Greek or 
Aramean ? », « what biomanipulation made her pregnant », we would 
immediately turn our attention away to completely irrelevant questions. 
We would commit the same mistake (that is commit the same sin of 
inattention) if, in a sort of misplaced realism, we were to try to convince 
others that Luke did not invent this episode. He (or some other author to 
whom Luke’s label is attributed) did invent it, no question about it, but is it 
a good or a bad invention ? that is, did the story elaborate a re-
representation of what there was to say, or did it rationalise it away by 
inventing a more realistic episode to justify a belief ?34 It will not do either 
to try to purge the Scriptures of every single element which is not well 
attested, because then we would end up with a few obscure Ur-aramean 
sentences uttered by a ghostly ‘Ieshoua’. We would have obtained purity 
but nothing to say (as Whitehead again says : « Man does not live on bread 
alone, but he does not live on disinfectants either ! »). What we want is to 
regain an understanding of every wave of invention without abandoning a 
single one of them, and not reach for an impossible purity, an original 
clarity disengaged from all later historical elaborations, embellishements, 
and outright pious lies. What we want to be able to grasp is the whole 
modus operandi again, the generator of so many ‘pious lies’. 
 Despite a long-standing interest in Biblical exegesis, I have no 
authority to express the original truth of this text. But since the text 
pertains to everyone, I can do exactly as Luke did and elaborate, 
embroider, expand, retranslate, rationalise, betray, by adding to this 
ancient layer another much more common one and see if the superposition 
of both will not generate the flash, the spark, that is the only real content of 
the word ‘spiritual’ in religious speech-acts, its only true origin.  
It must have happened to all of you to hear a word that has turned 
you from a dead absent-minded, goal-anxious non-entity into an alert, 
present, alive person. There are words, expressions, gestures, usually but 
not always associated with what we call ‘love talk’, which deeply modify 
the passage of time and the feeling of what it is to be a person. It is 
sometimes a very transitory and tenuous experience or a definitive and 
durable transformation, but what is sure is that the content of the words 
uttered is not crucially important : neither their elegance, nor their 
information capacity, or their novelty count. « I love you » is as boringly 
repetitive as the millions of Annunciations that fill our museums' walls. 
And yet, this does not mean that those forms of speech are meaningless or 
indifferent ; on the contrary, everyone knows exactly (but with what sort of 
                                                
34 As Bultman has shown long ago, rationalisation and mythification go together, the 
second one filling in more episodes to answer the logical urges of the first. It is well 
known in mythology, where the most recent versions of historical episodes are always 
those with the most details. 
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exactness ?) when they are well said and badly said, truthful and deceitful. 
The advantage of love talk is that it is utterly down to earth, down to sex, 
and that they are not, in spite of a lot of romantic exaggeration, prone to 
be distorted by belief in belief and access to a world of beyond.  
I don’t claim that you can reduce personhood to what happens when 
you are being addressed by the offer, by the gift, by the present of a form of 
speech that makes you present instead of absent, alive instead of dead, alert 
instead of distant. Personhood is obviously made of so many layers of law, 
politics, narratives of self, authorship, the unconscious, identity cards, 
physiological knowledge, that no form of life can be said to create it from 
scratch. And yet, it is understandable with the ‘immediacy of assent’ 
requested by Whitehead, that those who have never felt the present of 
presence that we call love are not persons in the sense that they are not 
fulfilled, the fulfilment of time has never occurred to them, they remain in 
absence and distance and sorrow and angst.  
Why did I establish a short circuit between the outdated tale of 
Annunciation and contemporary love-talk ? I should not lose heart at this 
concluding moment, and yet it is so perilously difficult that I might fail 
entirely to re-represent the power of religion.  
I am not saying that the Annunciation’s gesture of acceptance and 
generation of ever present God, is ‘explained’ by the temporary expedient 
of speaking in terms of love-talk. This would be performing the rather 
indecent act of offering an apologetic explanation, refreshing old stories by 
the sugar coating of a fresh one. I am not interested in proving that Luke’s 
fable is right. On the other hand, I am not so debased as to say that the 
Annunciation story is nothing but a ‘figure of speech’ to say « I love you » 
in a more cosmic and universal idiom than love-talk which has become in 
our age heavily psychologized and individualized. This would be close to 
blasphemy in spite of a theological insistence on using the word ‘Love’ to 
code God and one's neighbour.35 I am not either pretending that, across 
the mutations of centuries, a single content has remained intact despite the 
many strange or ordinary stories in which it might be have been cast, and 
that what our two stories mean is ‘simply’ the abstract concept of ‘person 
in presence’. This would be doing a sort of Kantian rationalisation of 
‘religion within the limits of strict reason’. Religion (no more than reason, 
by the way) cannot resist breaking the limits of rationalism for there is 
nothing more foreign to its speech-act than remaining constant over 
centuries through indifferent modes of expression. As every lover knows so 
well : the mode of expression, the tone, is everything and the information 
content of what is uttered is nothing. So, to look for the rational kernel in 
religious lessons apart from the many extravagant modes of expressions 
                                                
35 For once, French is richer than English since it uses the beautiful word ‘le prochain’ 
which is different from ‘le voisin’ to mean that, in a religious speech act, we are never 
talking about someone far away; but English, strangely enough, ignores the 
difference between the neighbour that is close by ethnicity or proximity and the 
stranger that has been made a neighbour by some act of charity. 
79- A sermon-RES   30 
handed down through history, is more than meaningless. 
So what have I done, if I am claiming that I am saying none of these 
three things ? It is easier to say negatively what I mean because the 
redirection of attention is an essential feature of those performative speech-
acts, the only one left to us (this is what is so characteristic in religious 
images).36 What I am saying is different : by inventing the Annunciation 
tale somewhere in the 1st century, the author of Luke’s Gospel did 
something to his audience that made them understand anew what they 
were meaning by ‘God incarnated’, which made them re-understand what 
was meant by ‘’Times are accomplished, the Kingdom of Heaven has 
arrived’’, something which we no longer, centuries later, understand but 
that Luke made resoundingly clear —for a specific time and for a specific 
audience— by superimposing those three different layers of expression.  
This is the more difficult moment of my peroration : by superimposing 
today those different layers of expression -- love-talk, the metaphysics of 
presence, the charming and venerable Annunciation fable -- I have done 
(or rather, I would have done, had I had the nerve to give a sermon and 
not a lecture), today, to you, the same thing that Luke did to re-represent 
the power of a religious speech act. This is after all the very definition of a 
sermon : the recasting of what was already said through different means of 
expression.  
Had I succeeded, a lightning connection would have been established 
between those ancient dead venerable texts and our congregation today. A 
connection which would have ignored the passage of time and established 
some sort of union, of communion between those to whom Luke speaks, 
Luke himself, and us, here, today. If you find indecent to establish a 
relation between those glorious times and saintly Fathers and our time, our 
clumsy and impotent souls, don’t forget that no matter how great they 
were, they are dead and we are alive, so the duty of re-presenting Presence 
weighs on our shoulders no matter how miserable we are, not on their 
dead bones.37 But because I have certainly failed, you will conclude that 
the speaker who used to be a hard boiled critical scholar has become 
raving mad, and I will conclude that I have committed the mortal sin of 
uttering in vain the name of God by failing to produce the ‘immediacy of 
assent’ which is so essential to its right evocation.  
Amen. 
 
 
                                                
36 For Catholic renaissance images, see the remarkable L. Marin Opacité de la peinture. 
Essais sur la représentation . (Paris, Usher, 1989), and the more recent G. Didi-
Huberman  Fra Angelico. Disssemblance et figuration. (Paris, Flammarion, 1990). For the 
Protestant control of pictures, see J. L. Koerner. “L'image dans la Réforme et les 
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37 This is one of the essential themes of C. Péguy Clio Dialogue de l'histoire et de l'âme 
païenne. Oeuvres en prose. (Paris, La Pleïade, Gallimard 1961). 
